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Forst: The Annulment Controversy: Revival of Prior Alimony Payments

THE ANNULMENT CONTROVERSY: REVIVAL
OF PRIOR ALIMONY PAYMENTS
INTRODUCTION

As the legal and social barriers have fallen away, divorce has
become more prevalent and acceptable. The latest Census shows that
one out of every three marriages in America will end in divorce.1 Annulment, on the other hand, is a very ancient remedy for dissolution of
the marital relationship and its incidence is declining today in light of
liberalized divorce laws. 2 Nonetheless, a substantial number of annulments are decreed each year to legally rescind marriages."
Provisions for alimony, child support, and property division typically accompany a decree of divorce. However, because the incidence
of remarriage has also increased,4 many difficult issues arise as to the
extent and duration of support obligations between ex-spouses. Despite the increases in the dissolution of marriages and in the frequency
of remarriage, the law in Oklahoma remains in disarray with regard
to certain aspects of divorce, alimony, and annulment. One such un1. U.S. BUREAU OF THnE CENSUs, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P-20, No.
312, Marriage, Divorce, Widowhood, and Remarriage by Family Characteristics: 1975,
at 7 [hereinafter cited as POPULATION REPORTS].
2. See H. CLARK, THE LAw OF DoMESTic RELATIONS IN THE UNrrED STATES § 11.1
(1968) [hereinafter cited as CLRK].
3. Figures compiled by the Oklahoma State Department of Health (Provisional
Statistics 1976). The number of annulments granted in previous years are as follows:

1976
1975
1974

51
307
199

1973

245

1972
226
The number of marriages and divorces in Oklahoma during this same period are as follows:
MARRIAGES
DIVORCES
1976

40,985

21,236

1975
40,110
20,334
1974
40,160
19,687
1973
41,367
19,687
1972
40,767
18,063
4. Latest figures indicate that 66% of all divorced women remarry. See, PoPuLATION REPORTS, supra note 1, at 9. There has been a 30% increase in the number
of women remarrying between 1960 and 1974. See, U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, SrATSTCAL ABSTRCT OF THE U.S.: 1976, at 68 (97th ed.) (Statistical percentages for the
number of men remarrying are not available).
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settled issue in Oklahoma, as well as many other states, is whether the
annulment of a later marriage revives the prior husband's obligation for
alimony.
Typically, a decree of divorce grants the wife alimony, which shall
terminate upon death or remarriage.5 If she remarries, but subsequently has this marriage annulled, is she entitled to the resumption
of alimony payments from her former husband? Does the annulment
mean that the later marriage never existed, or rather that it validly
existed and only became a nullity at the time of the court's decree?
In either case, shall that answer determine whether a later marriage,
subsequently annulled, is a "remarriage" within the meaning of the
decree granting alimony?
Finding answers to these questions is difficult. The common law
is hopelessly unclear as to this controversy; it has not been dealt with
by statute in Oklahoma, nor has the Oklahoma Supreme Court ever
ruled on the issue.6 While at least two district courts in Oklahoma have
considered the question,7 the rising incidence of divorce, the alternative
of annulment, and the increase in remarriages may force the state's supreme court or legislature to settle this area of the law.
This comment will discuss the implications of a remarriage, subsequently annulled, as it relates to the resumption of alimony and provide
a current survey and analysis of the law. In this context, the law of
annulment in Oklahoma, as well as other jurisdictions, and the implications of alternative policies will be reviewed. Finally, a compromise
approach for the resolution of this issue will be proposed.
THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF AN ANNULMENT

Background

To examine and understand the issue of alimony revival, it is
necessary to review the general concepts surrounding annulment, its
definition, and legal effect. From the twelfth century to the middle
of the nineteenth century, marital relations in England were within
5. Although many references in this comment are to the wife seeking alimony resumption, courts have taken a similar approach when it is the husband who is seeking
continuation of support from his earlier wife. See, e.g., Beckett v. Beckett, 272 Cal.
App. 2d 70, 77 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1969).
6. See notes 44-48 infra and accompanying text.
7. Fleming v. Fleming, 45 OKLA. B.A.J. 2488 (Ct. App. 1974); Rutherford v.
Rutherford, No. D-74-9-P.C. (Kay County Ct., Okla. May 30, 1975).
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the exclusive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. The law reflected
the Christian belief that marriage was a sacrament giving rise to an in-

dissoluble relationship. 8 In the extraordinary circumstances where the
church would permit dissolution of the bond, an ecclesiastical fiat in

the form of an annulment was decreed.9 The effect of such a decree
was to declare that the church had never recognized the purported
union. In legal theory, the marriage never existed.' 0

The concept of annulment evolved through the common law and
today it is generally a remedy defined by statute which reflects society's

attitude that, for one reason or another, the marriage should not be
recognized. Unless there is a legal defect at its inception, a marriage
cannot be annulled; instead, the proper remedy is divorce." At the

outset, it is essential to the validity of the marriage that the parties
freely consent; when mutual consent is lacking at the time the cere-

mony is performed, the marriage may be annulled.'

Most states, in-

cluding Oklahoma, have additional grounds for annulment. 13 These

include consanguinity or incest, 14 polygamy,' 5 nonage,' 6 mental inca8. "What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put assunder." Matthew
19:6.
9. This was a decree a vinculo matrimonii. The other form of relief available, a
decree of divorce a mensa et thoro, was not a true divorce or annulment. Rather, this
later decree merely accorded the parties a legal separation, leaving them still man and
wife. 2 J. BRYCE, STUDMES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENcE 826-27 (1901).
10. See id. at 811-30. See also CLARK, supra note 2, at § 11.1; Comment, The
Void and Voidable Marriage: A Study in Judicial Method, 7 STAN. L. Rv. 529, 538
(1955) [hereinafter cited as STAN. L. RPv.].
11. An action for annulment of a marriage differs from a divorce proceeding in that
the latter is instituted to dissolve a marriage relation that is legally existent, whereas
an annulment is for the purpose of declaring that no valid marriage ever existed. An
annulment is also distinguishable from divorce in that the former exists for causes existing at the time of the marriage, while the later is ordinarily available for causes arising
after the marriage. 3 W. NELSON, DrvoRcE AND ANNULMENT, § 31.04 (2d ed. 1945).
12. OK.LA. STAT. tit. 43, § 1 (1971); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1283 (1971). See, e.g.,
Martin v. Martin, 157 Fla. 835, 26 So. 2d 901 (1946) (where the groom drugged his
prospective spouse, who had never consented to the marriage and was not aware of the
ceremony until several hours after it had been performed).
13. In cases of incest and polygamy, the marriages are considered void and an annulment action for a formal decree is not necessary, although often sought and granted.
Whitney v. Whitney, 192 Okla. 174, 134 P.2d 357 (1942). All other grounds for annulment are cases where the marriage is considered voidable and a court decree is necessary
to declare it a nullity. Note, Void and Voidable Marriages, 14 OKLA L. Rpv. 304, 307
(1961) [hereinafter cited as OKLA. L. REv.]. For a discussion of the confusing voidvoidable dichotomy, see notes-25-37 infra and accompanying text.
14. OKrA. STAT. tit. 43, § 2 (1971).
15. OKLa. CONST. art. I, §2.
16. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 3 (Supp. 1976). The age of 18 is generally the age when
people gain the legal capacity to consent to marriage. Nonage refers to those under
the prescribed age who seek to marry. In Oklahoma, the minimum age limitation may
be avoided by parental consent, or judicial authorization in certain instances. Id.
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pacity, 17 and, until recently declared unconstitutional, miscegenation. 8
In addition to these statutory grounds, marriages may be set aside in
equity, on grounds of duress, jest, undisclosed impotency, fraud and

pregnancy by another at the time of the marriage. 19
By far the most common ground for annulment today arises from
the so-called "penalty marriage." Oklahoma law provides: "It shall
be unlawful for either party to an action for divorce whose former husband or wife is living to marry.

..

a person other than the divorced

*....
0 Violation of this provision subjects
spouse within six months .
if
the later marriage to annulment either party to the later marriage

institutes legal action."'

Statutes such as this constitute the basis for

the greatest number of annulments awarded today.22 As shall be
pointed out, the grounds on which an annulment is granted may be
relevant in regard to the propriety of reinstating the alimony obligation.

23

OperationandEffect: The Annulment Trichotomy

The evolution of the law of annulment has been neither logical
nor consistent. Central to any discussion regarding the operation or
legal consequences of an annulment is an examination of the development of a strange trichotomy; a distinction among marriages as being
"void," "void ab initio" or "voidable." A marriage with a defect constituting grounds for annulment is susceptible to any of these three interpretations:2 4 First, the marriage was absolutely void from its inception
17. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1283 (1971).
18. Prohibition of miscegenation was declared unconstitutional as a denial of duo
process and equal protection. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Dick v. Reaves,
434 P.2d 295 (Okla.1967).
19. See In re Mo-se-che-he's Estate, 188 Okla. 228, 107 P.2d 999 (1940). Impotency and pregnancy by another are also grounds for divorce. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 1271 (1971). It would appear that the party may elect either remedy.
20. OKrA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1280 (1971).
21. OKLA. STAT. tit.
12, § 1281(b) (1971).
22. Because of liberalized divorce laws, annulment is becoming less frequent but it
is still widely used for penalty marriages. Until recently, California and New York accounted for almost 73% of all annulments in the United States and this was directly
traceable to their restrictive prohibited remarriage period following a final divorce decree. Comment, The Aftereffects of Annulment: Alimony, Property Division, Provision for Children, 1968 WAsH. U.L.Q. 148, n.4 [hereinafter cited as WAsi-. U.L.Q.].
23. See notes 33-44 infra and accompanying text.
24. 3 W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNuLmENT, 281-83 (2d ed. 1945); Molloy, Bad

Laws Make Hard Cases; State ex rel Angvall v. District Court, The Law of Annulment
in Montana, 36 MONT.L. REV. 267 (1975) [hereinafter cited as MONT. L. Rnv.]; OKLA.
L.REV. supra note 13, at 304; STAN. L.REv. supra note 10, at 529-30.
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and, in essence, never existed. 25 Second, the purported marriage was

merely voidable, but upon the decree it became void ab initio.26
Third, a valid marriage relationship existed between the parties up until

the date that the court decreed it a nullity.27 Logically, a void marriage
has never existed and thus is incapable of causing any marital consequences. A voidable marriage on the other hand, is valid until
annulled. Based on the nature of the defect, marriages are classified
28
as void or voidable by either case law or statute.

The classification of the marriage as either void or voidable would

appear to be dispositive of the issue of the proper effect to be given
an annulment. However, this is not the case due to a confusing legal
fiction known as the "relation-back" doctrine which provides the basis
for the void ab initio classification. Few legal fictions have engendered

as much confusion as this one.29
Under ecclesiastical law, a defective marriage was simply void and
regarded as nonexistent.

But as the concept of annulment evolved

through common law, the courts recognized that a union which did in
fact exist could not be ignored.

To deal with this discrepancy, the

courts adopted the idea that the defective marriage was merely voidable, and that, unlike a void marriage, a judicial decree terminating the

marriage was necessary.30

Although such a decree was necessary, it

was generally held that the decree of nullity "related back", so as to
render the relations of the parties illegal from the beginning. Even

where the marriage was classified as voidable, and thus valid until decreed a nullity, upon this decree the marriage became void ab initio.
25. A void marriage is considered to have never existed and a judicial decree so stating is not even necessary. See, Comment, Void and Voidable Marriages, 27 MOD. L.
REv. 385, 386 (1964). This reflects a strong social or moral policy against even recognizing the marriage in cases such as bigamy or incest. See Drummond v. Irish, 52 Iowa
41, 2 N.W. 622 (1879); Feamow v. Jones, 34 Okla. 694, 126 P. 1015 (1912).
26. Marriages declared void ab initio are usually those contracted by persons not
of legal age or who are otherwise incompetent. See, e.g., Ross v. Ross, 175 Okla. 633,
54 P.2d 611 (1936); Hunt v. Hunt, 23 Okla. 490, 100 P. 541 (1909).
27. In cases of voidable marriages, they become a nullity only as of the time of
the decree and until that time are valid. See, e.g., McDonald v. McDonald, 6 Cal.2d
457, 58 P.2d 163 (1936); White v. McGee, 149 Okla. 65, 299 P. 222 (1931).
28. For example, where a man who already has a wife marries, the later marriage
is considered absolutely void and not to exist. OKLA. CONsr. art. I, § 2. On the other
hand, where the marriage is between two minors, the union is considered merely voidable, and becomes a nullity only as of the decree. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 3 (Supp.
1976); McKee v. State, 452 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. 1969); White v. McGee 149 Okla.
65, 299 P. 222 (1931). See notes 25-27 supra.
29. The concept has been criticized in several cases. See notes 30-34 infra and
accompanying text. See generally Annot., 45 AJ..R. 3d 1033 (1972).
30. See note 13 supra.
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When the relation back doctrine is applied, there is the anomalous re-

sult that a decree of annulment has the same effect upon both void
and voidable marriages; it relates back to the time of the marriage con-

tract so that, de jure, the marriage never existed.8 1 This confusing

fiction arose from the judicial need to recognize the existence of a rela-

tionship which would survive in the absence of judicial action, while
at the same time allowing the court's decree to reflect early religious

precepts that annulment was a punishment for "unscriptural marriages." 32

This common law rule, however, has not been consistently
followed by the courts. As the law of annulment further evolved, the
courts began to recognize that if they consistently applied the relation

back doctrine, so that "no marriage ever existed", enormous complications arose as to the legitimacy of children, the availability of property
settlements, inheritance rights, and the marital communications eviden-

tiary privilege. 33

"In general there has been little uniformity of ap-

34
proach in the cases involving the retroactive effects of an annulment.1

Some courts have refused to apply the relation back fiction to voidable
31. See STAN. L. Rav., supra note 10, at 530.
32. See, MONT. L. Rav. supra note 24, at 269. It would be absurd to pretend, after
two people had lived together in a purported marital union, that no relationship existed.
Nevertheless, this relation back doctrine was developed in early eccelesiastical canons
and incorporated into the common law.
33. In addition to the alimony question, the interpretation given the annulment can
define what other legal consequences attach to an annulled relationship. For instance,
the interpretation has implications as to the children born of that marriage. If the court
concludes that the marriage was void and never existed, children of that marriage would
be illegitimate. This was the case at common law. In re Moncreif's Will, 235 N.Y.
390, 139 N.E. 550 (1923). Recognizing the harshness of this rule and its societal implications, most states have statutes declaring children of annulled marriages to be legitimate. See, e.g., OKirA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1283 (1971).
Rights of inheritance are also affected. If wife, W, who is a party to a marriage
with a defect, dies, husband, H, will be heir at law if the marriage is merely voidable;
but he will inherit nothing if the marriage is void. Plummer v. Davis, 169 Okla. 374,
36 P.2d 938 (1934). Another problem arises where W is a party to a marriage with
a defect and H injures her. If this marriage is classified as void, W may be able to
bring suit against H in an action for personal injuries. If however, the marriage is
classified as merely voidable, and thus valid until annulled, W may be precluded from
bringing the action where one spouse is prohibited from suing the other. State ex rel
Angvall v. District Court, 151 Mont. 483, 444 P.2d 370 (1968).
An additional problem arises in the field of evidence. Does the marital communications privilege protect statements made between parties during a marriage that is subsequently annulled as void? California has ruled that the privilege does protect communications made during such "marriage" though later annulled. People v. Godines, 17
Cal. App. 2d 721, 62 P.2d 787 (1936) (where the marriage was voidable). Contra,
People v. Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430, 455 P.2d 759, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1969) (whero
the marriage was void).
34. STAN. L. REV. supra note 10, at 533.
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marriages where the results would be socially undesirable or especially
8
harsh. 3
The trend over the years has been to abandon the doctrine of
relation back.3 6 Cardozo criticized this legal fiction by observing that

a decree of annulment "could not obliterate the past and make events

unreal. ' 7 Nevertheless, the retroactive annulment fiction continues to
pervade some judicial thinking. Due to this division, the variety of

interpretations and legal effects assigned an annulment decree is both
confusing and contradictory.

Further confusion is generated when,

from this variety of approaches, one is selected for the specific purpose of determining whether a subsequently annulled marriage was a

"remarriage" for the purpose of terminating the alimony obligation

of a former spouse. The determination that the later marriage was
valid until annulled, that it became void ab initio, or that it was always

void, is in no way conclusive.
Some courts have held that the annulment revives the prior

husband's alimony obligation in cases where the marriage was void."8
Other courts have ruled that the obligation does not continue even
though the later marriage was void. 39 Likewise, where the annulled

marriage was merely voidable, some courts have ordered the alimony
reinstated, 40 while others have ruled that the obligation for alimony is

not revived. 4 ' Pursuant to another view, it has been held that the
alimony obligation is never revived upon an annulment. 42 Finally, at
least one court has sought to avoid the theoretical quagmire by denying

reinstatement of an earlier alimony obligation on the theory that the
remarriage of the wife, even though it was later annulled, constituted
35. STAN. L. REv. supra note 10, at 532-36. Instead of declaring a voidable
marriage void ab initio, many courts today recognize that such a marriage can "ripen
into" a valid marriage when and if the defect is removed, as in cases where minors reach
majority during the marriage. See White v. McGee, 149 Okla. 65, 299 P. 222 (1931);
Mantz v. Gill, 147 Okla. 199, 296 P. 441 (1931).
36. See STAN. L. Rav., supra note 10, at 534-43.
37. American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 9, 166 N.E. 783, 786 (1929).
38. Reese v. Reese, 192 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1966); Minder v. Minder, 83 N.J. Super. 159,
199 A.2d 69 (1964); Denberg v. Frischman, 24 App. Div. 2d 100, 264 N.Y.S.2d 114,
aff'd mem. 17 N.Y.2d 778, 217 N.E.2d 675, 270 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1965), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 884 (1966).
39. See, e.g., Torgan v. Torgan, 159 Colo. 93, 410 P.2d 167 (1966).
40. See, e.g., Robbins v. Robbins, 343 Mass. 247, 178 N.E.2d 281 (1961).
41. Evans v. Evans, l2l So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1968); Bridges v. Bridges, 217 So. 2d 281
(Miss. 1968); Chavez v. Chavez, 82 N.M. 624, 485 P.2d 735 (1971); McConkey v. McConkey 216 Va. 106, 215 S.E.2d 640 (1975).
42. Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218, 124 N.E.2d 290 (1954).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977

7

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 1, Art. 10

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[-Vol. 13:127

an irrevocable waiver by her of any alimony rights which she may have
48
possessed against her former spouse.
THE LAW AS APPLIED

Implications of the Interpretation
An examination of the case law dealing with annulment illustrates
how the confusing trichotomy of interpretations has developed in Oklahoma and how a particular interpretation would be chosen to achieve
the desired result. It also becomes clear that in light of recent judicial
trends and modem statutory provisions, the trichotomy should be
abandoned.
Typical of the cases where the question of alimony revival upon
annulment is'at isue is Fleming v. Fleming.44 There, the plaintiff wife
was granted a divorce by the District Court of Carter County, Oklahoma in 1970. The decree provided that her former husband was to
pay alimony in monthly installments. Plaintiff later remarried and the
defendant ex-husband terminated his alimony payments, contending
that the plaintiff was now financially able to maintain herself and that
termination of alimony upon remarriage was sanctioned in Oklahoma
by a statutory provision. 4r However, this marriage was annulled shortly
thereafter on grounds of the mental incapacity of the second husband.
Plaintiff then brought an action asking the court to reinstate her former
husband's alimony obligation. Her position was that her later marriage
had "never existed," and, consequently, there was no basis for the defendant's unilateral termination of alimony. The district court disagreed and found that the purported remarriage terminated the husband's obligation. However, on appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and ruled that because an annulment
was secured, "no marriage ever existed." 40 The alimony was ordered
reinstated. However, since a state statute provides that no court of
appeals decision shall be binding or cited as precedent unless the
47
supreme court, upon review, orders the opinion officially published,
48
the-law in Oklahoma remains unsettled.
43. Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal. 2d 872, 291 P.2d 439 (1955).
44. 45 Okla. B.AJ. 2488 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974).
45. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1289 (Supp. 1976).
46. 45 Okla. B.AJ. 2488 -(Okla. Ct. App. 1974).
47. OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 30.5 (Supp. 1976).
48. The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not so order, and denied certiorari of Fleming. 46 Okla. B.AJ. 944 (1975).
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The Law in Oklahoma
Like other jurisdictions, Oklahoma has classified marriages as
void or voidable depending on the nature of the defect existing at the
time of the ceremony. 49 All three interpretations of annulments, void,
void ab initio, or valid until annulled, have found their way into Oklahoma decisions, resulting in confusing inconsistencies.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has found some marriages to be
absolutely void and thus has regarded them as never having existed.
In Fearnow v. Jones, 0 the court found that an incestuous marriage was
absolutely illegal and void, and that no rights or privileges whatsoever
arose from the relationship. However, in Krauter v. Krauter,51 the
court, while finding the incestuous marriage absolutely void, nevertheless ruled that the wife was entitled to a division of the property jointly
acquired during the "nonexistent" marriage. Krauter suggests that
some legal consequences attach to an annulled relationship and that
even a void marriage may nevertheless be regarded as a marriage if
a court of equity recognizes that a property settlement is consistent
with fairness.
In Whitney v. Whitney,"' the plaintiff wife sought a property
settlement at the end of a purported marriage. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court applied the void ab initio concept to the polygamous marriage and
stated that since the annulment related back to make the marriage void
from its inception, no legal consequences could attach to the relationship. Therefore, the wife was entitled to no property. Likewise, in
Clark v. Barney,"3 the court expressly rejected the notion that the marriage could "ripen into" a valid relationship and reiterated that a
polygamous marriage was void ab initio. The court, in Clark, endorsed
the tradtional concept of retroactive annulment, which was founded on
moral precepts, stating: "And whilst it is the policy of the law to encourage legitimacy, yet, in order to do so, it will not encourage licen54
tiousness."
In later decisions, the Oklahoma courts recognized that the effect
of declaring a marriage nonexistent was frequently a harsh one, especi49. See notes 13-21 supra and accompanying text.
50. 34 Okla. 694, 126 P. 1015 (1912).
51. 79 Okla. 30, 190 P. 1088 (1920).
52. 192 Okla. 174, 134 P.2d 357 (1942).
53. 24 Okla. 455, 103 P. 598 (1909).
54. Id. at 459, 103 P. at 600 (The court's use of the word "legitimacy" pertained
to the validity of the marriage).
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ally where children and property were involved'r The courts then
began applying the voidable classification with varying results. In Hunt
v. Hunt,"0 two minors entered into a marriage which was subsequently
annulled due to their incapacity or nonage. The court ruled that a marriage with this defect was voidable and not void. This being the case,
the husband was estopped from denying the marriage and was ordered
to pay child support to his former wife. In Ross v. Ross," it was declared that where the husband lacked capacity, specifically mental incompetency, the marriage to which he was a party was merely voidable.
The court reasoned that since he continued to cohabit with the
woman after the defect was removed, he had ratified the marriage and
could not have the relationship declared void ab initio so as to avoid
the legal consequences of that union. However, the Ross and Hunt
decisions appear to be in conflict with the more recent court of
appeals opinion in Fleming, whch held that a marriage with the defect
of incapacity was void and never existed.
As previously stated, the most common incidence of annulment
arises from the penalty marriage.58 Inconsistencies are also present
in the application of the void-voidable label to these marriages. In
early decisions, such as Atkeson v. Sovereign Camp, 9 a penalty marriage was classified as void. There the court applied the Oklahoma
penalty marriage statute which provided: "Any person marrying contrary to the provision of this section [within the six month penalty
period] shall be deemed guilty of bigamy and such marriage shall be
absolutely void." 0 The Oklahoma legislature noted dissatisfaction
with the result in Atkeson, and, on April 6, 1925, amended the law by
eliminating the clause which read, "and such marriage shall be absolutely void." 61 A few years later, in Plummer v. Davis,"2 the court held
55. "The American courts have softened this rule and the Oklahoma courts are no
exception." OKLA. L. REV. supra note 13, at 305. See In re Mo-se-che-he's Estate, 188
Okla. 228, 233, 107 P.2d 999, 1004 (1940), where the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted,
"In divorce matters modem civilization strongly condemns the harsh doctrine of ab
initio sentences of nullity." (quoting from Jones v. Jones, 119 Fla. 824, -, 161 So. 836,
839 (1935)).
56. 23 Okla. 490, 100 P. 541 (1909); See also Stone v. Stone, 193 Okla. 458, 145
P.2d 212 (1944).
57. 175 Okla. 633, 54 P.2d 611 (1936).
58. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
59. 90 Okla. 154, 216 P. 467 (1923).
60. OKiA. COmP. STAT. § 510 (Bunn 1921) (repealed, 1925 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch.
119, p. 166, § 1).
61. 1925 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 119, p. 166, § 1 (The present law is codified at OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, § 1280 (Supp. 1976)).
62. 169 Okla. 374, 36 P.2d 938 (1934).
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that, in light of Atkeson and the amended law, it was the intention of
the legislature that a penalty marriage should be voidable and not
void.6 3 However, this decision appears not to have been followed in
Rutherford v. Rutherford, 4 a 1975 Oklahoma district court case. In
Rutherford, the plaintiff was awarded alimony to cease upon her death
or remarriage. The wife remarried, but soon sought an annulment
upon the ground that her new husband's prior divorce was not yet six
months old and thus the marriage was in violation of the statute. The
district court agreed, but in applying the statute, ruled that the penalty
marriage was void. Alimony was reinstated.
The confusion regarding the classification of marriage in Oklahoma is further complicated by an examination of the line of cases
emanating from White v. McGee. 5 There the court stated that a voidable marriage is not invalid from its inception, but the parties are considered husband and wife until the marriage has been annulled. The
court abandoned the ab initio concept and recognized that a voidable
marriage may "ripen into" a valid marriage. 6 Thus, a voidable marriage is nevertheless a "remarriage" to which some legal consequences
may attach.
Since the precise question of alimony revival has not been settled
in Oklahoma, it is necessary to look to these cases defining other consequences attaching to annulments. The cases cited in this section
serve this purpose, but more specifically they serve to illustrate the
confusion and inconsistency in this area of the law. It is apparent that
the Oklahoma decisions are not only inconsistent, but also fail to con67
form to the modem trend of authority.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS:

A PROPOSAL

As emphasized already, confusion and disagreement exist among
the states concerning the effect of an annulment on the alimony obligation. Also clear is the need for resolution of these contradictions and
conflicts which inhere in the present state of affairs. Before consider63. See also Harvey v. State, 13 Okla. Crim. 299, 238 P. 862 (1925).
64. No. D-74-9-P.C. (Kay County Ct., Okla. May 30, 1975).
65. 149 Okla. 65, 299 P. 222 (1931); See also, In re Mo-se-che-he's Estate, 188
Okla. 228, 233, 107 P.2d 999, 1004 (1940).
66. In re Mo-se-che-he's Estate, 188 Okla. 228, 233, 107 P.2d 999, 1004 (1940);
Ross v. Ross, 175 Okla. 633, 54 P.2d 611 (1936).
67. See notes 89-100 infra and accompanying text.
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ing any improvements however, the policies underlying the void-voidable concept and the arguments for and against resumption of alimony
must be considered.
Abandoningthe Trichotomy
It has been suggested that the type of defect in the remarriage, and
thus its classification as either void or voidable, should be conclusive
as to whether or not alimony will be revived.0 8 Under this approach, recognition that a voidable marriage usually involves a less serious defect, 69 and that it can be ratified and validated, 70 would permit
it to be regarded as a "remarriage," allowing alimony termination. On
the other hand, a void marriage usually embodies a more serious defect,
such as incest or bigamy. Courts may feel compelled to deter such
"wrongful" marriages by simply denying their existence or refusing to
accord them any legal effect. In these cases, incidents, such as
alimony, would logically continue.
The better reasoned view however, recognizes that the use of the
void-voidable classification to determine the revival of alimony is
inherently defective. The defect lies in the lack of uniformity in application and result. The concept of retroactive annulment is an obsolete
legal fiction.7 1 The courts have applied that concept and the void or
voidable labels inconsistently to reach a particular, desired result. The
confusion thus engendered, has led some courts to modify and vary the
fiction of relation back. Others have refused to accept the fiction and
have abandoned altogether the distinction between void and voidable
marriages.72
An examination of the cases confirms the fact that the courts have
applied the annulment trichotomy inconsistently in order to avoid inequitable results. Such inequities include the possibility of making
68. STAN. L. REv., supra note 10, at 540-41.
69. See notes 13-21 supra and accompanyingtext.
70. In re Mo-se-che-he's Estate, 188 Okla. 228, 233; 107 P.2d 999, 1004 (1940);
Ross v. Ross, 175 Okla. 633, 54 P.2d 611 (1936).
71. See STAN. L. Rnv., supra note 10, at 537-38.
72. Torgan v. Torgan, 159 Colo. 93, 410 P.2d 167 (1966); Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308
N.Y. 218, 124 N.E.2d 290 (1954). As the New Jersey Superior Court, in Richards
v. Richards, 139 N.J. Super. 207, 353 A.2d 141 (1976), recognized:
Certainly, when a former wife remarries, the divorced husband d6es 'not' concern himself with any legal distinctions betWien vbid did v6idable. 'She'lifis
married. He is free. In the interests of fairness, the last previous husband
must be the source of the wife's future financial security., Restoration of alimony payments from a former husband must be denied.
Id. at -, 353 A.2d at 144.
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children illegitimate or denying a property division to the wife; both
of which could be the result if the marriage is ruled never to have existed. On the other hand, courts have also avoided the harsh rule that
no spousal rights can be acquired by a void marriage, and have effected
the distribution of property upon the dissolution of void and voidable
marriages by various theories, 73 such as, quasi-contractual obligation,7 4
quasi-partnership, 75 and grounds of equity and justice.76 These facts
reflect a judicial recognition that the law needs reform.
Considerationsfor Resumption
Potential solutions to the current state of affairs include the positions which uniformly revive or deny alimony upon an annulment.
Each view will be considered.
The leading case holding that an annulment revives the prior husband's obligation of alimony is Sleicher v. Sleicher 7 7 There, the New
York Court of Appeals applied the traditional notion of retroactive annulment, reasoning that the annulment related back and effaced the
marriage as if it had never been. 7 Since the second marriage was regarded as nonexistent, the husband's obligation of alimony was not
79
terminated.
The line of cases following Sleicher's reasoning consistently hold
that an annulled marriage is no marriage, and that the parties remain
in the same relation to each other.8 0 In holding that the alimony obligation survives the "attempted remarriage," these courts are greatly
influenced by the social policy of ensuring the wife a source of financial
support.81 This view may also reflect the courts' adherence to tradi73. See Note, Divorce-Alimony Decree Terminating Upon Remarriage of WifeEffect of Annulment of Subsequent Marriage, 8 V.ND. L. REv. 909, 911-12 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as VAlNt. L. REv.].
74. Ah Leong v. Ah Leong, 27 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1928).
75. Whitney v. Whitney, 192 Okla. 174, 134 P.2d 357 (1942).
76. Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 P. 1079 (1908).
77. 251 N.Y. 366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929); Although this case was severely questioned
and arguably overruled in Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218, 124 N.E.2d 290 (1954)

it is nevertheless cited by other jurisdictions as supporting the propriety of alimony resumption. See, e.g.,Reese v. Reese 193 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 1966).
78. 251 N.Y. at -,.167 N.E. at 502.

79. For reasons of equity, however, the court refused to allow alimony for the
period during which the voidable marriage was in effect. Id. at -, 167 N.E. at 502.
80. See Reese v. Reese, 192 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1966); DeWall v. Rhoderick, 258 Iowa
433, 138 N.W.2d 124 (1965); Robbins v. Robbins, 343 Mass. 247, 178 N.E.2d 281

(1961); Boiteau v. Boiteau, 227 Minn. 26, 33 N.W.2d 703 (1948).
81. Cecil v. Cecil, 11 Uta i 2d'15,356 P'.2d ,79 ('960).-
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tional thinking regarding the moral justifications for retroactive annulment.
Certainly, a strong argument can be made that it is the duty of
the courts to provide for the financial security of a divorced spouse.
The concept of alimony is generally based on a legislative determination that the husband's duty to support his wife is more contractual than
relational and continues beyond the dissolution of the marriage.8 2 Alimony serves a valid function in adjusting economic relationships between the parties. This policy and function should not be defeated
where the wife would have no other support. This line of reasoning
leads to the conclusion that since an award of alimony in an annulment
action is available in only a few states,83 the wife should not be precluded from the reinstatement of support by her prior husband.
ConsiderationAgainst Resumption
The better reasoned view is that the remarriage, even though later
annulled, conclusively terminates the support obligations of the prior
husband.8 4 The justification for such a policy is based on several considerations. However, the most persuasive reason for denying resumption of alimony is the realization that innocent wives and children of
remarried husbands should not suffer because former wives have made
foolish errors in their remarriages.8 ,

As discussed previously, the retroactive concept of annulment,
which voids the marriage ab initio, has fallen into disrepute due to the
82. See WAsH. U.L.Q., supra note 22, at 152. Recently, a growing controversy has
developed around the concept of alimony and its traditional automatic award. See
the recent case of Stansberry v.Stansberry, 48 Okla. B.A.J. 2107 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
83. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458.19 (1955); VA. CODE § 20.107 (Supp.
1976); OR REv. STAT. § 107.105 (1973); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 518.59 (West Supp.
1977); D.C.CODE § 16-910 (1966).
84. At the outset, one interpretation of the problem could be dispositive of the issue.
Some courts have interpreted the provision, "unless and until she remarries", in decrees
awarding alimony as contemplating the ceremony of marriage and not the acquisition
of the status of a valid marriage. The divorced wife's ceremonial marriage to a second
husband is regarded as a remarriage even though grounds for annulment existed at the
time. "Those interpereting the words as referring to the ceremony reason: First, no
one would contend that the separation agreement should be revived ifthe remarriage
ended in death or divorce and likewise it should not be revived in case of an annulment."
VAND. L. Rnv. supra note 73, at 911-21. If the remarriage should end in divorce or if
the second husband died penniless, the wife could not look again to her former husband
for support; the consequences of annulment should be the same. This logical argument
has found support in the courts. See, e.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S.W.
1066 (1920); Brandt v. Brandt, 40 Ore. 477, 67 P.508 (1902).
85. See Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218, 124 N.E. 290 (1954).
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harshness of its effect. New York and California have taken the lead
in abandoning the relation back concept of annulment. The decisions
in these states make no distinction between void and voidable marriages, and hold simply that an annulled marriage is nevertheless a
remarriage for alimony purposes. 86 These decisions are premised on
the belief that the reasonable expectation of both the wife and the first
husband is that the wife's remarriage will be valid. The first husband
should be able to rely on this expectation without "waiting in the wings"
for the possibility that the remarriage might be annulled87
In examining the implications of allowing the wife to reinstate
alimony, other justifications can be found for rejecting such a policy.
One obvious implication of reinstating the obligation is the potential for
abuse by the wife. In a case where the remarriage would "ripen into"
a valid marriage if not annulled, the wife would be able to assess the
relative financial situations of her present and prior husband. If she
determines that she would be better supported by her prior husband's
alimony payments, she might wish to annul her later marriage and regain this support."" This possibility becomes especially important in
a state like Oklahoma where at least some of the grounds for annulment
and divorce are the same. 9 If alimony can be revived by annulling
the second marriage, the wife can choose between two sources of
support. A divorce would present the opportunity for alimony from
the second husband, while an annulment would reinstate alimony from
the first. Few would disagree that she should not be given this control.9 0 In essence, the wife would have the power to "shop around"
for the most solvent husband from which to draw support payments.
Another consideration militating against the reinstatement of
alimony is the fact that a woman who was a party to an annulled marriage need not go remediless 'or be denied financial support. There
86. Fry v. Fry, 5 Cal. App. 3d 169, 85 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1970); Berkely v. Berkely,
269 Cal. App. 2d 872, 75 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1969); Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218,
124 N.E. 290 (1954).
87. Richards v. Richards, 139 N.J. Super. 207, -, 353 A.2d 141, 144 (1976). See
also Torgan v. Torgan, 159 Colo. 93, 410 P.2d 167 (1966).
88. Flaxman v. Flaxman, 57 N.J. 458, 273 A.2d 567, 570 (1971).
89. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1271 (1971) allows as grounds for divorce: Impotency,
pregnancy by another, fraudulent contract, and insanity. If these defects are present at
the time of the marriage celebration, the remedy of annulment is also available. See
notes 14-21 supra and accompanying text.
90. See Flaxman v. Flaxman, 57 N.J. 458, 273 A.2d 567 (1971); Richards v.
Richards, 139 N.J. Super. 207, 353 A.2d 141 (1976); Chavez v. Chavez, 82 N.M. 624,
485 P.2d 735 (1971).
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is authority for the proposition that the wife, under appropriate circumstances, can maintain an action for damages against the purported
husband of her annulled marriage in those cases where it was his
fraud which caused her to relinquish the first husband's support. 1
Fraud, in the form of undisclosed impotency or circumstances of jest
or duress at the time of the marriage, all constitute grounds for annulment.

92

The leading case for the view that alimony should not be reinstated upon the annulment of a later marriage is Gaines v. Jacobsen.
In Gaines, the New York Court of Appeals took a strong stand against
reinstatement of alimony by repudiating the disparate treatment between void and voidable marriages and holding that the retroactive effect of rescission must be limited by considerations of justice. The
court ruled that, upon his wife's remarriage, the husband should have
the right to regard himself as being free from any further financial responsibility. It was suggested that it would be particularly harsh to
limit the first husband in his capacity to assume new obligations: "He
could then assume new obligations-he could himself remarry .. .
without remaining forever subject to the possibility that his first wife's
remarriage would be annulled and the burden of supporting her shifted
back to him."'0 4 The court also noted that the financial solvency of a
new spouse is one of the risks that any wife takes upon marrying.0 5
Alimony is predicated on the husband's duty to support his ex-wife.
The obligation ceases upon remarriage since the ex-wife has acquired
another source of support; she has elected to share her second husband's
economic fortunes rather than depend on alimony. 9 This sound argument predicated on simple fairness is persuasive.
91. See Ah Leong v. Ah Leong, 27 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 636
(1928). Here the man and woman assumed a marital status for 35 years. The wife
bore 13 children and assisted the husband in a business in which they accumulated several hundred thousand dollars worth of property. Relying upon a 1920 Hawaii Supreme
Court decision, Parke v. Parke, 25 Haw. 397, which held that a license was a prerequisite to valid marriage, the husband ceased to recognize the woman as his wife and
denied her interest in any property. The court in Ah Leong rejected the claim, as tantamount to fraud, and ordered a distribution of the property. See also Roberts v. Roberts,
64 Wyo. 433, 196 P.2d 361 (1948); Cf. Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d

761 (1943).
92. See In re Mo-se-che-he's Estate, 188 Okla. 228, 107 P.2d 999 (1940). Here the
court discussed its broad equitable powers to annul a marriage for other than statutory
grounds, including fraud.
93. 308 N.Y. 218, 124 N.E.2d 290 (1954).
94. Id. at -, 124 N.E.2d at 293-94.
95. Id. at -, 124 N.E.2d at 295.
96. See STAN. L. Rav., supranote 10, at 542.
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As the doctrine of retroactive annulment falls prey to continuing
criticism, the courts of Oklahoma and other jurisdictions should adopt
a policy which denies reinstatement of alimony. Logic and justice dictate that the wife should be estopped from denying her remarriage and
seeking to reimpose an obligation on a former husband. The first husband is entitled to rely upon her new marital status. He must be free
to assume that his financial obligations to her have ceased if he wishes
to re-order his own affairs in confidence. This freedom would permit
him to change his mode of living or even to remarry and establish a
new family. There is no sound reason for treating an annulment any
differently from a divorce or death in this regard. 97
A Compromise Approach
A third, intermediate, approach to the problem is to make the
reinstatement of alimony contingent on the nature of the defect, the
status of the party seeking the annulment, and the length of time that
the putative marriage existed. This approach would be a compromise
between the absolute rules that uniformly deny or allow the continuance of support. Under this policy, the distinction between the voidvoidable classification would be irrelevant. The court would decide
the reinstatement question on a case-by-case basis utilizing these three
criteria.
The first, the nature of the defect or the grounds for the
annulment, would be relevant to the expectation of the spouse.
For example, if the party seeking the annulment suffered from lack
of capacity, they should not fairly be denied their rights under the
prior decree if an annulment is immediately sought. In these instances,
a party should not be penalized when they were not mentally competent to appreciate the serious nature and consequences of their
actions. On the other hand, where the party was in a marriage that
was incestuous, bigamous, or a penalty marriage, they should not be
rewarded by reinstatement of prior alimony upon voiding a union
with such an obvious defect. The second important criteria for the
court should be the status of the person seeking the annulment. If the
party seeking the annulment had knowledge of the defect at the time
of the ceremony, they should be estopped from denying the remarriage.
On the other hand, where the party to the annulled marriage was a
97. See Flaxman v. Flaxman, 57 NJ. 458, 273 A.2d 567 (1971).
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victim of the other's fraud, jest, duress, or concealment of impotence,
they should be able to immediately annul this fraudulent union and not
be penalized by a rule denying the reinstatement of former alimony.
A final factor would be the length of the putative marriage which is
subsequently annulled. If, in the court's opinion, the marital union existed for a period of time sufficient for it to be ratified or "ripen into"
a valid consensual relationship, the party should logically be denied

former alimony. This compromise policy would obviate the need for
resort to the traditional notions of retroactive annulment and, in conformance with modem thinking, adopt a policy that is flexible and

equitable.

8

Essential to the success of any formula for determining the rein-

statement of alimony is legislation allowing consideration of the question on its own merits. This would require that the other inequities
or harsh results which might accompany annulment be rectified or
avoided by statute. Oklahoma, 90 like most states,1 00 has adopted a statute that declares children of annulled marriages to be legitimate.
Other states have statutorily empowered the courts to effect some

equitable distribution of property upon annulment, just as in divorce
proceedings. 10 1 Finally, several states have by statute allowed the wife
to receive alimony from the husband of the annulled marriage, thereby

completely eliminating the controversy as to revival of the former husband's obligation. 0 2 By codifying these principles, the law in this area
would be greatly clarified, the results would be predictable and equit03
able, and the confusing annulment trichotomy could be abandoned.1

CONCLUSION
The question of whether annulment of a later marriage revives
98. This proposed policy approach is largely a product of the author's own analysis.
However, it appears that at least two courts would find merit in such a model policy.
See, e.g., Gevis v. Gevis, 147 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (noting wife's knowledge
of the defect at the time of the marriage); Beckett v. Beckett, 272 Cal. App. 2d 70,
77 Cal. Rptr. 134, 1136 (1969) (discussing the parties' detrimental reliance on the validity
of a new marriage).
99. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1283 (1971).
100. See, e.g., CAL. CrviL CODE § 4453 (West 1970); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 14-2-110
(1973); N.Y. DOM. REL. Law § 175 (McKinney 1964).
101. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458.19 (1955); VA. CODE § 20.107 (Supp.
1976); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.105 (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.59 (West Supp.
1977); D.C. CODE § 16-910 (1966).
102. See, e.g., ALAsKA SrAT. § 9.55.210 (1973); CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 46-51
(Supp. 1977); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1964).
103. For an excellent discussion of statutory provisions for alimony, child support,
and property division as to an annulled marriage, see WASH. U.L.Q., supra note 22.
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a prior husband's alimony obligation is one that has been considered
in numerous jurisdictions. Many, including Oklahoma, have yet to resolve the issue. The policy adopted regarding the alimony question
has many implications since it can affect the entire spectrum of legal
consequences that may attach to the annulled marital relationship.
Presently, a variety of devices are used to resolve the problem.
Whether the courts should continue to adhere to the confusing doctrine
of ab initio nullity and the inconsistent classifications of void and voidable, is questionable. The better alternative would be for the Oklahoma legislature to follow the lead of states that deny reinstatement,
but statutorily protect the financial security of the wife by allowing a
party to an annulment to receive alimony and a property division from
that annuled marriage.
As an alternative to legislative reform, the courts could adopt one
of two policies. The first would reinstate alimony contingent on an examination of the grounds for the annulment, the knowledge of the party
as to the defects, and the length of time that the putative marriage existed. The second approach would make a policy decision that a later
marriage, even though annulled, is a "remarriage" and conclusively
terminates any obligations of a husband under a prior decree.
Adoption of either of the latter policies would strengthen and
clarify Oklahoma's position in the area of domestic relations. Statutory
reform, however, would be preferable as this legislation could define
precisely on what grounds, and under what circumstances, reinstatement of alimony would be appropriate. The enactment of such a statute would indicate a legislative intent that the wife look to her most
recent "husband" for continued financial security, regardless of the
reasons for the dissolution of that marriage.
In any case, resolution of the issue must be based upon legally
and socially relevant factors. This would permit the abandonment of
the confusing notions of void and voidable marriages and instead allow
the termination of alimony obligations upon any "remarriage," whether
subsequently annulled or not. This policy recognizes the inequity of
subjecting divorced spouses to the spectre of renewed liability many
years after their marriage was dissolved.

Bradley Paul Forst
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